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 We describe the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s National Nosocomial Infections
Surveillance system. Elements of the system critical for successful reduction of nosocomial infection
rates include voluntary participation and confidentiality; standard definitions and protocols;
identification of populations at high risk; site-specific, risk-adjusted infection rates comparable
across institutions; adequate numbers of trained infection control professionals; dissemination of
data to health-care providers; and a link between monitored rates and prevention efforts.
According to a 1996 Institute of Medicine (IOM) report,
preventable “adverse health events,” a category defined as
injuries such as medical errors (a failure of planned actions)
and hospital-acquired infections caused by medical interven-
tions, are responsible for 44,000 to 98,000 deaths per year at
a cost of $17-$29 billion (1). The IOM report recommended
immediate and strong mandatory reporting of medical errors
and voluntary reporting of other adverse health events,
suggesting that monitoring leads to reduction. A hallmark of
monitoring any adverse health event is reporting the
information back to those who need to know. We examine the
value of feeding back information on hospital-acquired
infections to reduce and prevent them.
Hospital-Acquired Infections Surveillance
Systems as a Model to Monitor and
Prevent Other Adverse Health Events
Hospital-acquired infections affect approximately 2
million persons each year (2). Such infections have been
monitored in the United States since the 1970s, and the
monitoring is often a model for monitoring other adverse
health events (3). Principles used in the surveillance of
hospital-acquired infections are strikingly similar to those
used in the continuous quality improvement process in
manufacturing (4). Both systems emphasize changes at the
system rather than individual level. Deming described two
types of errors in manufacturing: special causes and usual
causes. Special causes of error comprise only 5% to 10% of all
errors; usual causes constitute the remainder. Similarly, only
5% to 10% of hospital-acquired infections occur in recognized
outbreaks (4,5).
Surveillance Systems for Hospital-Acquired Infections
Surveillance is defined as “the ongoing, systematic
collection, analysis, and interpretation of health data
essential to the planning, implementation, and evaluation of
public health practice, closely integrated with the timely
dissemination of these data to those who need to know” (6).
The scientific value of surveillance as part of a hospital
infection-control program was demonstrated most strongly in
the landmark Study of the Efficacy of Nosocomial Infection
Control (SENIC) (2). In that study, highly trained data
collectors evaluated more than 338,000 patient records from a
probability sample of U.S. hospitals to calculate infection
rates. The hospitals’ control programs were also evaluated.
SENIC found that hospitals with the lowest nosocomial
infection rates had strong surveillance and prevention
programs. Other studies have suggested that surveillance
also has a strong scientific basis. For example, the collection,
calculation, and dissemination of surgeon-specific, surgical
site infection (SSI) rates to surgeons were found to reduce SSI
rates in all published studies (3,6-9).
During the last two decades, hospitals have established
internal systematic monitoring of hospital-acquired infection
rates. Monitoring with benchmarks external to those of a
single hospital’s surveillance system has also been suggested
(10). A single hospital may use its own definitions, methods,
and monitoring protocols. Developing a monitoring system
with external benchmarks requires considerable additional
effort.
To be successful, a multicenter monitoring system must
satisfy three requirements: it must have a very clear purpose;
it must use standard definitions, data fields, and protocols
(including of cohorts or groups to be monitored and periods of
data collection); and it must identify an aggregating inst
itution to standardize definitions and protocols, receive the
data, assess them for quality, standardize the approach to
risk-adjusting the benchmarks, and interpret and dissemi-
nate the data.
The NNIS System
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC’s)
National Nosocomial Infections Surveillance (NNIS) system
has been serving as an aggregating institution for 30 years.
The NNIS system is a voluntary, hospital-based reporting
Address for correspondence: Robert Gaynes, Hospital Infections
Program, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1600 Clifton
Road, Mailstop E55, Atlanta, GA 30333; fax: 404-639-6458; e-mail:
rpg1@cdc.gov296 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 7, No. 2, March–April 2001
Special Issue
system established to monitor hospital-acquired infections
and guide the prevention efforts of infection control
practitioners. In 1999, 285 hospitals in 42 states participated
in the NNIS system (11). All NNIS hospitals have >100 beds
and, on average, are larger than other U.S. hospitals (median
bed size: 360 versus 210); however, NNIS hospitals have a
geographic distribution similar to all other U.S. hospitals.
The NNIS system establishes a national risk-adjusted
benchmark for nosocomial infection rates and invasive
device-use ratios (12,13) by using uniform case definitions
and data-collection methods and computerized data entry and
analysis. To promote the latter, CDC provides infection
control practitioners with 28 hours of training and sponsors a
biennial conference.
Patients in intensive-care units (ICUs) are at high risk
for nosocomial infections and since 1987 have been monitored
in the NNIS system by site-specific, risk-adjusted infection
rates according to ICU type (12). The risk-adjusted
benchmark infection rates and device-use ratios are
published annually for use by both NNIS and non-NNIS
hospitals (12). (Internet address for NNIS SemiAnnual
Report: http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/hip/surveill/NNIS.htm).
Data Quality
For an aggregating institution to assess the quality of
data, meaningful surveillance definitions of adverse health
events must be available. These definitions do not define
clinical illness; rather, they are used for credible, consistent
application across institutions. There is always a balance
between the resources expended to find these cases and the
value within the institution of using the collected data and
comparing them to the external benchmarks. There is no
single source of information that allows an infection control
practitioner to accurately identify hospital-acquired infec-
tions. CDC definitions of nosocomial infections include
clinical and laboratory information that requires training,
counseling, and updating—tasks that are largely the
responsibility of the aggregating institution. Several studies
have examined attempts at shortcuts around the training and
counseling components; all studies suggest that medical
record abstractors perform very poorly compared with
infection control practitioners in case-finding for nosocomial
infections (9). Hospital-acquired infection case ascertainment
is time-consuming, and the process is becoming more difficult
with earlier discharge of patients and lack of agreement on
methods of postdischarge surveillance (14,15). Progress in
this area has been slow, and more efficient methods of case
ascertainment are needed. Sands et al. have proposed using
exposure to antimicrobial drugs as a sensitive method for
finding cases of SSI in the postdischarge outpatient setting
(16). Although this method is efficient, many institutions are
unable to acquire antimicrobial-drug use data for outpatients
who have recently undergone hospital surgical procedures.
Finally, despite current difficulties, a recent study in NNIS
hospitals suggests accurate case finding can be achieved
(Table 1).
Measuring Infection Rates: Endemic-
or Epidemic-Disease Rates?
Surveillance measures the endemic-disease rate of
nosocomial infection. Less than 10% of all nosocomial
infections occur in recognized outbreaks (5). If an outbreak
occurs in a hospital, it is often because one prevention
strategy failed for a short period. The endemic-disease rate
provides hospitals with knowledge of the ongoing infection
risks of hospitalized patients when no recognized outbreaks
are occurring. This rate represents 90% to 95% of all hospital-
acquired infections (5). Thus, ongoing surveillance measures
the endemic-disease rate. Unlike outbreaks, rates established
by ongoing surveillance usually require that many problems
be addressed to lower a high rate of infection.
Measuring Success in a Surveillance System
From 1990 through 1999, we examined risk-adjusted,
hospital-acquired infection rates used by participating NNIS
hospitals (18). We found that decreases in risk-adjusted
infection rates occurred at all three body sites (respiratory
tract, urinary tract, and bloodstream) monitored in ICUs (18).
Substantial decreases in bloodstream infection rates occurred
in medical (44%), surgical (31%), and pediatric (32%) ICUs
(Figure). Decreases also occurred in other ICU types (Table 2)
Table 1. Estimates of accuracy of prospectively reported infections in
nine NNIS Hospitalsa
   Predictive value
  positive  Sensitivity Specificity
Infection site      (%)    (%)   (%)
Bloodstream 87 85 98.3
Pneumonia 89 68 97.8
Surgical site 72 67 97.7
Urinary tract 92 59 98.7
Other 80 30 98.6
aAdapted from Emori TG, et al. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol (17).
Figure. Trends in bloodstream infection rates by type of intensive
care unit, National Nosocomial Infections Surveillance system, 1990-
1999. Bloodstream infection rate is number of central line-associated
primary bloodstream infections per 1,000 central line-days.
Table 2. Decrease in hospital-acquired infection rates, NNIS, 1990–
1999
Ventilator-  Urinary
Bloodstream associated    tract
   infection pneumonia  infection
Type of ICU    ratea (%)   rate (%)  rateb (%)
Coronary 43 42 40
Medical 44 56 46
Surgical 31 38 30
Pediatric 32 26 59
aCentral line associated.
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and in infection rates at other sites (18). The reasons for these
decreases are unknown, but several explanations are
possible. First, the improvements seen in NNIS hospitals also
reflect other national efforts to prevent infections (e.g., new
research findings, prevention guidelines). Second, the U.S.
health-care system has shifted away from hospital-based
care. Some of the observed rate reductions could be
attributable to this shift. However, a portion of these observed
decreases likely represented true decreases in hospital-
acquired infection rates in NNIS hospitals. Disseminating
risk-adjusted, reliable infection rates within NNIS hospitals
to infection control practitioners, patient care givers, and
administrators was an essential part of NNIS efforts during
the 1990s. By all reports, patient-care personnel began to
perceive value in the data, relied on them for decisions, and
altered their behavior in ways that may have reduced the
incidence of nosocomial infections in NNIS hospitals. By
changing the behavior of patient care givers, the NNIS
approach to surveillance of nosocomial infections may have
actually improved the quality of patient care. This report (18)
demonstrated the value of the NNIS system as a model for
preventing hospital-acquired infections (18).
Critical Elements of a Surveillance
System for Hospital-Acquired Infections
The NNIS elements critical for successful reductions in
infection rates included 1) voluntary participation and
confidentiality; 2) standard definitions and protocols; 3)
defined populations at high risk (e.g., intensive care, surgical
patients); 4) site-specific, risk-adjusted infection rates
comparable across institutions; 5) adequate numbers of
trained infection control practitioners; 6) dissemination of
data to health-care providers; and 7) a link between
monitored rates and prevention efforts, where patient-care
personnel relied on the data to alter their behavior in ways
that may have reduced the incidence of nosocomial infections
(17).
Challenges for the NNIS System’s Future
Despite NNIS’ success, many challenges remain. The
IOM report recommends mandatory reporting of medical
errors (1). Others have advocated public availability of such
information. But achieving accurate data may be difficult if
mandatory reporting and public availability of these data are
required in all circumstances. These requirements heighten
the need to assess the accuracy of self-reported data from
institutions, a process that is difficult and expensive. The
demand for publicly available data is particularly troubling.
The NNIS Evaluation Study has suggested that, while data
on nosocomial infections are generally accurately reported,
sensitivity (underreporting of infections) was a more serious
problem than other measures of accuracy such as predictive
value positive or specificity (17). When the added pressure of
publicly available data is added to a process that already has
a tendency to miss cases of nosocomial infection, the
possibility of serious underreporting of infections becomes
cause for concern. Validating data is essential if data from
performance measurement systems are to be credible.
All segments of the health-care community may not want
or need the same data or the same level of detail in the data.
Take the example of a consumer purchasing an automobile.
The consumer rightly anticipates that the car will have a
braking system that is safe and fully operational and thus
would find the rate of errors for brake installation from the
manufacturer of limited interest. This rate of error would be of
vital interest to the manufacturer, however. Similarly, it is
doubtful that regulators, payers, the public, or the health-
care institution all want the same information with the same
level of detail.
The medical marketplace is very dynamic. Surveillance
must also be dynamic to keep pace with the changing
environment. Improved methods of case ascertainment,
especially with regard to postdischarge and outpatient
surveillance, will be needed as more health care is provided
outside the hospital. Improvement in measures of intrinsic
and extrinsic patient risk factors will also be needed for
improved risk adjustment. As computerization and integra-
tion of health care continue, these improvements will be
possible. However, sound epidemiologic principles used by
knowledgeable workers must guide use of the new
technologies. A key to NNIS’s success is infection control
practitioners who use monitoring data to implement
prevention activities. Any new system for preventing adverse
health events will need to develop a cadre of professionals at
the health-care facility to design and implement the
prevention programs to promote patient safety and health-
care quality (19).
Demonstrating the value of surveillance data to both the
hospital’s patient-care personnel and administration is
essential. However, patient-care personnel must perceive
value in the data; if they do, they will rely on the data for
decisions and alter their behavior in ways that should reduce
the incidence of nosocomial infections. By changing the
behavior of care givers, surveillance of nosocomial infections
or other adverse health events can improve the quality of
patient care. However, SENIC suggested that only
approximately one third of nosocomial infections are
preventable (2). Better measures of adverse health events,
including of nosocomial infections that are truly preventable,
will make this monitoring more efficient and useful (20).
Prevention measures will help move nosocomial infections
from adverse health events to what the IOM described as
medical errors (1). Solving the problem of medical errors still
has its challenges.
Better understanding of the inner workings of the health-
care delivery system to determine the root cause of errors is
needed. Additionally, consistently good performers in a
system where interhospital comparison of rates has been
performed can identify the best practices. We are only
beginning to understand the multiple prevention efforts of
these high performers and how they differ from those of other
institutions.
Despite the difficulties and challenges, application of
epidemiologic principles can lead to success. A surveillance
system to monitor hospital-acquired infections requires
standardization, targeted monitoring, risk adjustment,
trained professionals, and a link between the disseminated
data and prevention efforts. A system such as the NNIS
system with all these critical elements can be successful in
preventing infections.
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